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Children's Ideas about the Moral Standing and
Social Welfare of Non-human Species
GAIL

F. MELSON

Department of Human Development & Family Studies
Purdue University
Moral and social welfare issues related to humane treatment of
animals confront children and continue to be important societal
issues through adulthood. Despite this, children's moral reasoning
about animals has been largely ignored. This paper addresses six
questions concerning how children reason morally about non-human animals: (1) How do children think about the moral claims of
animals? Is there a developmental progression in such reasoning?
(2) How does moral reasoning about animals differ from moral
reasoningabout other life forms-plants and ecological systems?
(3) What is the relation, if any, between children's moral reasoning about non-human animals and their moral reasoning about
other humans? (4) How do child characteristicsand environmental factors contribute to individual differences in children's moral
reasoningabout animals? (5) What is the relation between moral
reasoningabout animals and children's behaviors toward animals?
(6) What is known about children's kindness toward and nurturing of animals-examples of prosocial reasoning and behavior?
Key words: animals, non-human species, children, moral standing,
social welfare

No contemporary issue is more pressing than human
treatment of other species and the natural world that they
all share. Animal (henceforth, this term refers to non-human
animal species) mistreatment, species endangerment and
habitat threat demand our attention. The ecology of animal
life is under siege from environmental degradation, global
warming, and biodiversity depletion. These issues command
headlines but remain recalcitrant problems resistant to real
change. This is not surprising, given the complexity of such
problems, requiring consideration of economic, demographic,
structural, and sociological factors, among others. However,
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increasingly, both scholars and public opinion are recognizing
that an important influence on human behavior toward other
species and the environment lies in human thinking about
moral and social welfare issues. Human stances toward other
living beings and environments flow from the moral claims
(or lack thereof) they make. Therefore, it is important that we
understand moral reasoning about other species, their ecological niches, and the environment that sustains them as well as
humans.
According to Piaget (1965), Kohlberg (1976), Gilligan
(1982), and Hoffman (2000), reasoning about the moral claims
of others develops most rapidly during childhood, and once
reaching its "mature" level, becomes relatively more stable.
Until recently, these "others" have meant humans, reflecting
a bias within the study of child development that has neglected children's connections with non-humans (Melson, 2001).
Moral reasoning about human-human relationships may
not generalize to human engagement with animals, plants,
or nature. Knowledge concerning the development of moral
reasoning about other humans remains sparse. Despite important contributions (Kahn, 1999; Kellert, 1997), the study of the
"development of eco-morality" would benefit from further
theoretically derived structure and empirically derived detail.
("Eco-morality" refers to moral reasoning related to non-human life forms and their ecological niches.) Therefore, this
paper focuses on children's ideas about the moral and social
welfare claims of animals as well as plants, animal habitats,
ecology, and environmental issues.
Children's moral reasoning about animals is emphasized,
for the following reasons: (1) From an early age, children
view animals as other subjectivities, rather than objects, relating to them as living actors who have autonomy, intentionality, and feeling (Myers, 1998). As Myers and Saunders (2002)
note, these characteristics, shared with humans, make animals
potential targets of children's moral reasoning and behavior,
eliciting expressions of just treatment, caring and concern. (2)
Companion animals share most children's homes as "family
members" (Melson, 2001). (3) Children's attachment to their
animals is well documented, with links to emotional support
(Bryant, 1985), empathy (Melson, Peet, & Sparks, 1992),
and nurturing others (Melson & Fogel, 1996). (4) Despite
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urbanization and environmental degradation, children everywhere have contact with wild animals, not only in zoos,
aquariums and nature parks, but also in backyards, streets and
around their homes (Melson, in press). (5) Animal symbols
abound in children's media, stories, imagination and play,
making animals important carriers of meaning, including
moral meaning.
There are additional reasons to study moral reasoning as
it relates to animals: (1) Adult views about animal welfare,
animal rights, endangered species, and habitat protection may
have roots in childhood. British university students who had
companion animals growing up were more concerned about
animal welfare as adults than were their peers without a animal-keeping history (Paul, & Serpell, 1993). (2) Children encounter debates about vegetarianism, use of animals in medical
and non-medical research, animal rescue efforts and related
animal moral dilemmas, as well as issues of environmental
damage and species protection. Some evidence suggests that
children are making complex judgments about environmental
issues. In one study, 2 nd and 4 th grade children of farm workers
judged pesticide exposure as morally wrong but nonetheless
accepted it as a financial necessity for their families (Severson
& Kahn, 2010).
Specifically, we explore the following questions: (1) How
does children's moral reasoning about animals develop? (2)
How does children's moral reasoning about animals differ
from their moral reasoning about other life forms, such as
plants, and about environmental and ecological issues, such as
pollution, habitat protection and global warming? (3) What is
the relation, if any, between children's moral reasoning about
non-human life forms and other people? Do children generalize from their understanding of ways to treat other humans to
the treatment of animals, for example? Or, does thinking about
animal rights and welfare prompt moral concern about other
humans? Another possibility is that moral reasoning may be
compartmentalized, with no consistent relation between thinking about animals and thinking about people. (4) What accounts
for developmental change in moral reasoning about animals?
Stage theories of attitudes toward animals (Kellert, 1985),
values concerning nature (Kellert, 2002), and reasoning about
ecological issues, such as pollution (Kahn, 1999, 2002) must
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explain the mechanisms of developmental change, whereby
children "advance" from one stage to another. (5) What is the
relation between children's moral reasoning about and behavior toward animals? Developing a moral stance toward human
relations with animals requires navigating a thorny, often contradictory terrain. Animals as "pets" are loved and cared for as
"family members," but other animals are eliminated as pests,
consumed for food and clothing, and used as workers, aides,
and research subjects. Some (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 1982;
Herzog & McGee, 1983) suggest that societal attitudes toward
animals are inherently diverse, contradictory, and irrational.
What then might predispose children to engage in behaviors
consistent with, or at variance with, their moral reasoning
about animals? This has obvious implications for children's
behaviors related to animal welfare, conservation, and species
protection. (6) What is the relation between children's moral
and pro-social reasoning about animals? Children's thinking about good, kind, and exemplary treatment of animals,
tapping ideas about generosity, altruism, and helping, addresses prosocial reasoning (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998) about
other species. This type of reasoning, termed "discretionary
moral judgment" by Kahn (1999), refers to worthy or virtuous
actions that while not required, are praiseworthy. Since, as we
noted above, behaviors toward animals are so complex and
variously justified, distinctions between obligatory and discretionary moral judgments may be challenging. For example, is
it praiseworthy but not obligatory to be a vegetarian, eating
no animal products? On the other hand, is vegetarian eating
a moral obligation (Turiel, 1998)? Pro-social reasoning about
animals is at the heart of debates about species protection, conservation, and environmental protection.
Descriptions of Children's Moral Reasoning about
Animals
Do children view animals as having moral claims? Adults
would distinguish among living dogs, a stuffed dog, and a
picture of a dog in assessing moral standing. Actions that might
be morally wrong-damaging, discarding-with respect to
the living dog would not be viewed in the same way toward a
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stuffed dog or picture of a dog. There is convergent evidence
that children do view living animals-pets, domestic animals
and wild animals-as having moral standing. Moreover, like
adults, children distinguish living animals from non-living
analogues, such as robotic animals, in assessing moral claims
(Melson et al., 2009). However, the developmental progression
of such views is unclear.
Myers' (1998) observations and interviews with preschoolers concluded that they accorded a variety of animals status
as living subjects with intentions and emotions. These views
of animals led children as young as three years of age to be
concerned about the animals' well-being and to feel they deserved just and fair treatment, the "should" of moral standing.
However, in another study, when preschoolers were directly
asked about the moral standing of a stuffed dog and a robotic
dog, most children accorded them moral claims as well (Kahn,
Friedman, Perez-Granados, & Freier, 2006). For example, 69%
of preschoolers said it was "not OK" to hit a stuffed dog, and
73% said it was "not OK" to hit a robotic dog. However, in
this study, children were not asked about a living dog. When
Melson et al. (2009b) directly compared seven- to fifteen-year
old children's views of the moral standing of a living dog with
that of a robotic dog, the former was significantly more likely
to be viewed as having moral standing. Among these children,
85% said it was "not OK" to hit the living dog, while 78% said
it was "not OK" to hit the robotic dog. While fewer children
endorsed moral claims for the robotic dog, a relatively high
percentage of children accorded the robotic dog moral standing in this question.
Other scholars suggest that moral reasoning about animals
remains egocentric until adolescence. Kellert (1985), in his
studies of attitudes toward animals, finds that a "moralistic"
attitude emerges only in the teen years. Dunlap (1989) used
Kohlberg's stage theory to assess adolescent boys' reasoning
about moral dilemmas involving animal treatment. She found
that 12-14-year-olds used less advanced moral reasoning than
16-18-year-olds, lending support to the hypothesis that moral
reasoning about animals continues to develop through adolescence. Most boys in the 12-14-year-old group reasoned at
stages two and three, while those in the 16-18-year-old group
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were more likely to reason at stages three and four. (Stage
two, "individualism and instrumental exchange," focuses on
acting to meet one's own interests but also letting others do the
same, in a fair or equal exchange. Stage three, "mutual interpersonal relations," emphasizes concern for those close to you
and maintaining trusting and loving relationships with them.
Stage four, "social system and conscience," focuses on upholding social order and contributing to society.)
Kahn's work on moral reasoning about environmental
issues (1999) may help us integrate these divergent results. In
a series of cross-cultural studies, with children ranging from
1 st grade to college age, Kahn assessed whether or not certain
environmentally damaging behaviors, such as water and air
pollution, which also harm animals, were viewed by children
as morally wrong. While he found that most children at all
ages viewed polluting as morally wrong, children's reasoning
about why it was morally wrong showed a developmental progression. With advancing age, children were more likely to use
what Kahn calls "biocentric" reasoning, defined as the view
that nature (including animals) has intrinsic value and moral
standing apart from human needs. However, such biocentric
reasoning occurred only in a minority of children, even among
adolescents. Most children justified environmental protection
based on human needs, a view Kahn terms "anthropocentric." This distinction between judgments of moral standing
and reasons for morally obligatory behaviors may help us understand developmental differences in moral reasoning about
animals.
In one study (Melson et al., 2009b) of children's reasoning
about an unfamiliar friendly dog, Canis, with whom each child
had a short play session, 7-15-year-olds strongly endorsed the
moral standing of Canis. Each child was asked six questions
about treatment of Canis (see Table 1). Questions 1 through 5
posed a series of increasingly harmful actions (from ignoring
a distress signal to destroying the animal), while Question 6
asked about hitting the dog. For each question, the child was
asked if it was "OK" or "not OK" to engage in the harmful
action. Following each question, the interviewer prompted the
child with "Why?" "How come?" in order to elicit the child's
reasons or justifications for his or her answer ("OK," or "not
OK").
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Table 1. Questions and justification examples related to moral standing of Canis, an unfamiliar dog (Melson et al., 2009b)
Moral standing questions

If Canis were whimpering, would it be OK or not OK to
ignore Canis?
If Canis' leg breaks, is it OK or not OK not to fix it right away?
If you decided you did not like Canis anymore, is it OK or not
OK to give Canis away?
If you decided you did not like Canis anymore, is it OK or not
OK to throw Canis in the garbage?
If you decided you did not like Canis anymore, is it OK or not
OK to destroy Canis?
Is it OK or not OK to hit Canis?
Justifications

Anthropocentric: Reasoning from impact on child's own feelings or well being.
Example: "It's not OK to hit Canis, because I would feel bad."

Biocentric: Needs of animal apart from human needs.
Example: "It's not OK to hit Canis, because that would hurt
him."

Biocentric-isomorphic: Reasoning from similarity to
humans.
Example: "It's not OK to hit Canis, because it's just like hitting
a person."

Biocentric-transmorphic: Acknowledging similarities and
differences between animals and humans and despite differences, according animal moral standing.
Example: "It's not OK to hit Canis, because although he is a dog
and not a person, it still would not be right."

Assessing children's moral reasoning required taking into
account both their "OK; not OK" answers as well as their justifications. The initial "OK" or "not OK" answers indicated
whether or not the child considered Canis as having moral
standing. The follow-up justifications revealed the basis for
that moral standing. Would children argue for moral treatment of Canis because of their own needs (an anthropocentric
argument), or would they argue in terms of Canis' rights apart
from human needs (a biocentric argument)?
On average, over the six questions, children affirmed the
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dog's moral standing (by stating it was "not OK" to harm the
animal in ways shown in Table 1) 86% of the time (SD = 12%),
with no significant variation by age group or gender. When justifications were analyzed, all but one child mentioned a moral
obligation toward the dog at least once. The median number
of times appeals to moral obligation occurred was six, with
a range from once to 11 times, in the course of an individual
interview. Both anthropocentric and biocentric reasoning occurred across all ages.
Examples of each type of reasoning help illustrate these
categories. As an example of anthropocentric reasoning, one
child felt it was "not OK" to hit Canis, because "then Canis
wouldn't want to play with me." Another child also answered:
"not OK" to this question, and then explained: "Because Canis
would feel bad." This response focused on the dog's needs and
its right to be free from harm for its own welfare. A third child,
after indicating it was "not OK" to hit Canis, insisted, "It's
wrong to hit a dog" (child emphasis), indicating that hitting
this dog would violate a moral injunction against hitting any
dog.
In summary, Kahn's (1999) categories for moral reasoning
regarding the environment map easily onto moral reasoning
about a living animal such as a dog. However, we should be
cautious about generalizing from these responses. Canis was
a friendly calm dog, with whom children had an opportunity
to interact. Moreover, all the children in this study (Melson et
al., 2009a) had companion animals at home, and most had (or
had had in the past) a dog. Within that context, viewing possible harm to Canis as a moral issue might not seem surprising.
However, research shows that wild animals are also viewed
through a moral lens. Kahn's (1999) interviews with children
(from 1st grade to college age) in varied cultures (Portugal,
Houston, and Brazil) found that overwhelming majorities
cared about harm to wild animals such as birds and fish (as
caused by environmental actions such as polluting waterways)
and interpreted such actions as morally wrong. In fact, when
specific biocentric reasons for not polluting were examined,
the intrinsic value of wild animals was the most common.
Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that moral reasoning may differ depending on the specific species under consideration. Studies of adults' attitudes toward human uses of
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animals (e.g., hunting, medical research) find that attitudes
vary by species (Knight, Nunkoosing, Vrij, & Cherryman, 2003;
Plous, 1993). Adults consider a species' similarity to humans,
its capacity to suffer pain and its physical attractiveness in
making decisions about animal welfare issues. In addition, an
evolutionary perspective suggests that certain wild animals,
such as spiders and snakes, as well as large predators, would
elicit children's fears, since such animals posed a threat in the
environment of evolutionary adaptiveness (Heerwagen &
Orians, 2002). Studies of children's fears support this hypothesis (King, Hamilton, & Ollendick, 1998). Species that elicit
fear and avoidance may be less likely to be accorded moral
standing. Even when they are, children may be less likely
(than with dogs, for example) to reason biocentrically about
them. Another species difference that may be salient for moral
reasoning is the degree of emotional or phylogenetic closeness
to humans. Dunlap (1989) tested this hypothesis in examining
moral reasoning about a dog (emotional closeness), a chimpanzee (phylogenetic closeness), and a farm turkey (neither
emotional nor phylogenetic closeness). She found, as predicted, that moral reasoning about the dog and chimp was more
advanced than reasoning about the turkey.
Historical studies of attitudes toward wild animals (Oswald,
1995; Varga, 2009) provide further evidence that species differences affect moral reasoning. In Europe and North America,
the nineteenth century view was that wild animals, particularly wolves and bears, were savage threats to humans, had
no rights and could be mistreated, killed, indeed wiped out
with impunity. Books and toys for children celebrated hunting,
the extermination of species such as wolves, and "animaltainment," such as bear pits and organ grinder monkeys. By the
mid twentieth century, however, the threatening bear had
become the loveable teddy, and children's books depicted wild
animals now as hapless victims of savage humans (Melson, in
press). Thus, a historical perspective shows that some species
may become singled out as deserving special moral regard
and protection-pandas, whales, and dolphins come to mind
in contemporary discourse. Other species may become viewed
as threats to humans and placed outside the realm of moral
standing. We currently lack empirical evidence concerning the
degree to which children absorb these historical and cultural
moral messages and reflect them in childhood reasoning.
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Moral Reasoning about Animals in the Context of Reasoning about
Plantsand Ecological Systems
Plants. Children's moral reasoning about animals may
differ from that toward plants and toward ecology or nature.
Underlying the judgment of moral standing are children's
judgments that a being is alive, autonomous, sentient, intentional and feeling. Studies of children's attributions of aliveness or animacy document that by age four children attribute
aliveness to people and animals but not to vehicles or other inanimate objects. Young children group plants with inanimate
objects as "not alive" (Richards & Siegler, 1984). Only by age
eight do children understand that plants too are alive (Coley,
Solomon, & Shafto, 2002). This later understanding may occur
because: (1) Plants lack autonomous movement, a salient
feature of aliveness for young children; (2) Children reason
from humans to animals in understanding biology (Carey,
1985); and (3) Culturally, plants and trees occupy uncertain
moral terrain. Although some plant life-giant redwoods, for
example-may be seen as worthy of moral protection, most
plants are viewed as outside the domain of moral regard, at
least in contemporary Western cultures.
Ecologicalsystems. Moral reasoning about ecological systems
or issues may be more challenging than reasoning about
animals or even plants. Children's biological knowledge about
ecological systems lags behind their knowledge about individual animals (Leach, Driver, Scott, & Wood-Robinson, 1996;
Munson, 1994). Myers, Saunders, & Garrett (2004) found developmental trends in children's understanding of the ecological and conservation needs of wild animals. Children readily
understood animals' basic biological needs, such as food and
water. With increasing age, however, children were more likely
to recognize that animals needed appropriate habitat, space,
and shelter (ecological needs) as well as unpolluted air and
water, a protected area, and prohibitions against being hunted
or disturbed (conservation needs). Understanding the needs
of animals is likely to underlie moral reasoning about meeting
those needs. Taken together, these findings suggest that moral
reasoning about the ecological systems within which animals
are embedded is likely to be more difficult than reasoning
about individual animals. Reasoning at the level of a network
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of interrelated individuals and environments--ecologyshould be more cognitively challenging than reasoning at the
level of an individual.
Children'sMoral Reasoning about Animals and about Humans
While there are few direct comparisons of children's human-directed and animal-directed moral reasoning, evidence
suggests both differences and similarities. With respect to differences, when Dunlap (1989) compared adolescent boys' moral
reasoning about parallel dilemmas involving other humans
versus animals (dog, chimp and turkey), she found that, on
average, boys reasoned at higher levels, using Kohlberg's
stages, when considering a moral dilemma involving another
human. Similarly, Fonseca et al. (2011) found that school children in science classes reported a hierarchy of moral claims,
with humans more important morally than animals. Another
line of research has found that human-directed empathy and
animal-directed empathy are not related (McPhedran, 2009;
Patterson-Kane & Piper, 2009). Since empathy underlies both
moral reasoning and behavior, these findings lend support to
a "difference" argument.
At the same time, there is evidence that children draw on
their understanding of human relationships when they reason
about animals. As noted earlier, children generalize their biological understanding about humans to animals (Carey, 1985).
Kahn (1999) identified two types of biocentric moral reasoning-isomorphicand transmorphic-aboutenvironmental problems, such as air and water pollution. In isomorphic biocentric reasoning, the child identifies a correspondence between
humans and other natural entities, and uses that similarity to
justify moral treatment. In transmorphic biocentric reasoning,
the child recognizes both similarities and differences between
humans and other biological entities, but holds that despite
such differences, these non-humans deserve moral treatment.
Thus, in both isomorphic and transmorphic biocentric reasoning, the child takes account of human needs and rights,
but does so in order to justify the same moral rights for the
non-human.
In the Melson et al. (2009b) study discussed earlier, examples of isomorphic and transmorphic reasoning were found,
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showing that children used their understanding of the moral
standing of humans in thinking about that of an animal, such as
the dog Canis. As an example of isomorphic biocentric reasoning, consider the answer of the following child to the question
about hitting Canis: "It's not OK to hit Canis, because ... well,

how would you like it, if someone hit you?" Here, the child is
explicitly drawing an analogy between human and dog reactions to being hit. If it is morally wrong to hit the interviewer,
then by analogy, it is morally wrong to hit Canis. Across the
sample of 72 children, 411 instances of such analogical reasoning (Gentner, 2005; Goswami, 2001) were identified. All but
two children used analogical reasoning, drawing similarities
between the animal and humans, at least once during the interview. The number of instances ranged from one to 16, with a
median of five (Melson et al., 2009b). Transmorphic reasoning
occurred infrequently, but the following provides an example,
in response to the question: "If you didn't like Canis anymore,
would it be OK or not OK to give Canis away?" Child: "Yes,
it's OK." Interviewer: "Why? How come?" Child: "Because,
well it's not like a person, you could give a dog away, but only
if you could find a better home, and Canis would be happier."
Here, the child recognizes that while there are differences
between the animal and a person, the dog's welfare deserves
paramount consideration.
The connection, if any, between humans and animals as
targets of moral reasoning has important educational and
policy implications. Humane education efforts, focused on
the treatment of animals, are frequently justified, with little
empirical evidence, as also enhancing empathy toward peers
(Daly & Suggs, 2010) or reducing school violence (Favor, 2010).
Historically, the animal welfare and child welfare movements
were intertwined, with the assumption that advocacy of one
would promote the other (Melson, 2001).

Influences on Change in Moral Reasoning
As noted above, age differences in moral reasoning have
been found in a number of studies. If moral reasoning about
animals reflects general features of thinking about relationships, developmental change should be expected. Kohlberg
(1976) documented an age-related progression in stages of
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moral reasoning about human dilemmas, and Kahn's and
Kellert's examinations of environmental moral reasoning also
found age-related stages. These changes reflect both underlying cognitive maturation and age-related social experiences.
Among the more important social experiences may be the
child's relationship with family animals. Elementary schoolage children in the U. S. with strong attachment to their animals
score higher on measures of empathy toward peers (Daly &
Morton, 2006; Melson, Peet, & Sparks, 1992), while a study of
Chinese school children found that pet attachment was positively associated with willingness to take care of others (Zhou,
Zheng, & Fu, 2007). These studies did not directly measure
moral reasoning about animals, however. Empathy and willingness to care for others are related to, but not the same as,
moral reasoning. One study that directly measured moral
reasoning about treatment of an animal (Melson et al., 2009a)
found that a child's attachment to his or her companion animal
at home predicted moral reasoning about an unfamiliar dog,
Canis. Children more attached to their pets accorded Canis
more moral standing, viewing, just, fair and caring treatment
of Canis as morally obligatory.
It is at present unclear why attachment to one's companion
animal would be linked with greater empathy and more advanced moral reasoning about animals. One possible mechanism might be the role that animals play in family interactions,
including discussions about moral issues. Tannen (2004) noted
instances of parents using family dogs as "conversational resources" (speaking as, to, or about the dog) when teaching
children about values. In addition, family animals provide
many instances of "teachable" moments for parents. Robert
Coles (1997), reflecting on how experiences with animals can
build a child's moral intelligence, recounted how he had intervened to prevent his young son from playing too roughly with
their dog:
The dog in his own way was a teacher, one who had
helped all of us come to terms with the meaning of
understanding, to put oneself in another's shoes, to see
and feel things as he, she, or it does. (p. 84)
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The importance of animals as part of the dynamics of family
systems is further underscored in studies of animal abuse: children of animal-abusing parents are more likely themselves to
exhibit behavior problems and be at risk for harming animals
(Melson, 2001). Another pathway by which a companion
animal may help promote moral reasoning about animals is
through an animal's distinctive appearance, behaviors and
emotions. Relating appropriately to an animal requires attending to, and understanding a perspective very different from
that of the child. This may promote empathy and role-taking
ability, both of which underlie moral reasoning and behavior
(Melson, 2001). Several retrospective studies have linked childhood history of petkeeping and experiences with animals with
young adults' concern for animal welfare (Miura, Bradshaw,
& Tanida, 2002; Paul & Serpell, 1993). While the limits of retrospective data are well known, these findings support the hypothesis that childhood experiences with animals also may be
predictive of later adult moral reasoning.
Another social experience that may impact moral reasoning is discussion about moral dilemmas. Kohlberg (1976) emphasized that movement from lower to high stages could be
facilitated when children had guided peer discussions about
situations involving just and fair treatment of others. In addition to peers, parents influence moral reasoning. Parents
who discuss real-life moral situations, such as those involving honesty and cheating, using questions, warm emotional
support and higher level reasoning have children who, two
years later, reason about moral dilemmas at a higher level
(Walker & Taylor, 1991). Would such social experiences influence children to reason morally about animals and animal
welfare? Many humane education efforts assume that adults,
and to a lesser extent, peers, can help children reason morally
about animal welfare issues. Humane education curricula that
explicitly teach respect for all living things (thereby linking
humans and other animals) may prompt children to develop
more mature moral reasoning regarding treatment of animals.
However, there have been few tests of this hypothesis. A notable
exception is Ascione's (1992, 1997) year-long evaluation of the
People and Animals humane education curriculum developed
by the National Association of Humane and Environmental
Education (NAHEE). Elementary school age children who

Children'sIdeas about Non-human Species

95

participated in the program scored higher in empathy (largely
toward humans, although two questions asked about animals)
than did similar children in a control group. In addition, firstand fourth graders in the program (as compared to their controls) also reported more humane attitudes-for example,
answering no to questions like: "Should you spank a cat to
teach it to mind?" and "Do you think it's fun to break up a
spider's web?" A year after the program's end, fourth-graders
continued to express more humane attitudes, according moral
standing to animals, than did the control group. However,
measurable changes in humane attitudes failed to materialize
for second- and fifth-graders.
It is unclear what components of a humane education
program might stimulate moral reasoning about animals.
Kohlberg (1976) argued that discussion that promotes "disequilibration" of moral stage thinking is most effective in
helping a child reach a higher level of moral reasoning. By
this he meant that discussion of a moral dilemma should challenge the child's current level of moral reasoning and thereby
prompt the child to consider new perspectives and arguments.
Such "disequilibration" might naturally occur when children
have an opportunity to interact with living animals as part of a
humane education program. An evaluation of such a program
for first graders (Nicoll, Trifone, & Samuels, 2008) found that
when children were encouraged to role-play and do imaginative exercises with living animals, they scored higher on measures of animal-directed empathy (as compared to peers who
had a print-based curriculum with no animal visits). More
fine-grained evaluation of humane education programs might
help us identify such elements and provide a test of Kohlberg's
theory as applied to moral reasoning about animals.
Moral Reasoning and Moral Behavior
Very little is known about children's moral reasoning
about animals in relation to their behaviors. Research and
theory related to children's moral development with respect to
human relationships may be useful for hypothesis generation.
Rest (1986) argues that moral judgments about other humans
are not enough to predict moral actions. One must add recognition of how one's actions affect others-what Rest (1986)
calls "moral sensitivity,"-the desire to take action, ("moral
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motivation"), and enduring predispositions to moral behavior, ("moral character"). In general, children must go beyond
moral judgments, and in applying them to a specific situation,
the child must also: (1) recognize that this is a moral situation;
(2) feel that it is important relative to other considerations; (3)
feel moral emotions, such as empathy; and (4) feel competent
to act effectively (Jordan, 2007).
Many factors influence these intermediate steps between
judgment and action. Some of these variables tap individual
differences among children, while others address children's environments. Among those child factors that appear to mediate
the link between moral reasoning and moral behavior are: (1)
temperament; (2) behavioral problems; and (3) processing of
interpersonal and. socio-emotional information. Specifically,
children who are temperamentally inhibited (shy) are less
likely than uninhibited children to violate a moral injunction,
such as cheating, that they had previously agreed was morally
wrong (Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009). Highly
aggressive, "hard-to-manage" preschoolers are more likely
than their non-aggressive peers to reason egocentrically about
moral situations involving harm to other children (Dunn &
Hughes, 2001). Children with lower moral motives are more
likely to violate a moral prohibition against cheating that they
previously endorsed (Malti et al., 2009). (As an example of a
low moral motive, consider the child who states it is wrong
to steal, but who feels that a thief, after stealing, would feel
good.)
When one considers environmental factors that may
mediate moral reasoning and moral behavior, the nature of the
moral dilemma may be important. Many studies examining
the link between moral reasoning and moral behavior toward
humans compare children's responses to general hypothetical
moral dilemmas (to assess moral reasoning) with children's behaviors in specific real-life situations, often involving a temptation to violate a moral injunction, such as one against stealing, hitting, cheating, etc. In such studies, there is generally
a weak or non-existent link between reasoning and behavior.
However, when children's reasoning and behavior are assessed
about the same real-life situation, there is greater consistency
between reasoning and behavior (Xu, Bao, Fu, Talwar, & Lee,
2010). Thus, when children see how a general moral principle
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applies in a concrete situation, they are more likely to behave
morally. Parents and peers also are important. A parenting
style that encourages empathy (Spinrad et al., 1999) as well as
challenging peer discussions (Walker, Henning, & Krettenauer,
2000) can promote both more advanced moral reasoning and
moral behavior. In a rare study of family predictors of children's humane attitudes (Bryant, 1990), eight-to-thirteen year
olds who felt that their parents were emotionally available
and responsive also endorsed more humane attitudes toward
animals.
In summary, we may predict that consistency between
reasoning and behavior is enhanced when: (1) child temperament is relatively low on aggression and high on behavioral
inhibition and impulse control; (2) measures of reasoning and
behavior are aligned; and (3) parents and peers encourage empathic understanding and use "disequilibration" in their discussions about animals.
Pro-socialReasoning and Behavior toward Animals
Many social issues involving human treatment of animals
are framed as pro-social, rather than moral. This is exemplified in humane education materials, such as Kind News, a "for
kids" newspaper distributed by the National Association for
Humane and Environmental Education. Rather than presenting proper pet care, species protection and animal welfare as
moral imperatives, Kind News exhorts children to "be a friend
to pets," reminding children that "good pet owners care for
their pets as if they were people." Similarly, Kind News urges
protection of wild animals and environmental resources as behaviors that good and responsible people do. Environmental
educators, advancing "biophilic education," stress both the interconnections of humans, animals and environment, as well
as an orientation of "bonding, caring and sharing," (Cajete,
1999) designed to foster in children a stewardship identity
toward all living things. Surveys of teachers in elementary
school classrooms find that educators believe the presence of
live animals in the classroom helps to promote empathy (Daly
& Suggs, 2010).
Despite this emphasis on treatment of animals as pro-socially desirable and praiseworthy (rather than morally imperative), research on children's pro-social reasoning and behavior
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toward animals is lacking. Here too, research related to prosociality toward humans (sharing, helping, donating, kindness
and nurturing) may guide hypotheses applicable to relationships with animals. Kindness and nurturing are especially
relevant for understanding pro-sociality toward animals, for a
couple of reasons: (1) humane education emphasizes caring for
animals in terms of kindness; (2) The needs of distinct species
and their dependence upon humans make nurturing a more
relevant prosocial behavior than sharing or donating.

Reasoning about kindness and nurturing.As with moral reasoning, there is a developmental trajectory in the understanding of kindness. Kindergarten age children believe that any act
that benefits another-for example, a taller child getting down
a toy from a high shelf that a shorter child is unable to reachis kind, even if the act is unintentional, accidental, coerced or
rewarded. Only gradually with advancing age do children differentiate acts by motives, and consider only those acts motivated by a desire to benefit another to be truly kind (Baldwin
& Baldwin, 1970). This gradual understanding of kindness
is consistent with other evidence that pro-social reasoning is
largely learned through acquiring social norms, although some
young children show an early predisposition to pro-sociality
(Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). Because of this, various interventions have been developed to encourage kindness in children
to others (i.e., other humans). For example, Zeece (2009) advocates picture books with kindness themes (interestingly,
many with animal characters), while the Kindness Intentions
Program for preschool classrooms focuses on giving children
recognition for spontaneous acts of kindness they perform
toward their classmates and also observe in other children
(Tannock, 2009). However, evaluation of such interventions is
currently lacking.

Predictors of pro-social and nurturing behavior. Any program
designed to teach pro-social norms and behaviors must take
into account that influences on kindness and nurturing are
complex. As with moral action, pro-social behavior may be predicted from both child and environmental factors. Consistent
gender differences have been found, with girls more likely
than boys to show sympathy, compassion, and help toward
others (humans) (Spivak & Howes, 2011). Children are more
likely to help or care for others when they understand the
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need to do so, feel competent that they can help, and are not
distressed themselves at witnessing the distress or needs of
another (Trommsdorff, Friedmeier, & Mayer, 2007). Children
who are socially competent with peers-preschoolers skilled
at social pretend play, for example-spontaneously engage
in more acts of sharing, cooperation, kindness, and empathy
toward peers than do less socially skilled classmates (Spivak
& Howes, 2011).
Among the environmental factors predicting pro-social
behaviors, parenting style and modeling have been identified.
Parents who emphasize nurturing and caregiving, involving
their older children in the care of younger ones, are more likely
to have children who display more empathy and concern
for others as well as more motivation and skill in caregiving
(Whiting & Edwards, 1988). Indeed, in cross-cultural studies
that observe children's everyday social behaviors toward
humans across multiple contexts-family, kin network, neighborhood-and not just in classrooms of peers, pro-social behaviors of caring and helping are most often directed toward
younger children, especially infants and toddlers (deGuzman,
Carlo, & Edwards, 2008).
Although information on nurturing and caregiving toward
animals-usually companion animals-is sparse, it appears
that when animals are present in a home, children do engage
in caregiving toward them. Moreover, since opportunities for
and encouragement of nurturing others are rare in childhood,
at least in Western industrialized societies, nurturing animals
makes up a large proportion of childhood caregiving experiences. For example, analysis of daily activity records of a nationally representative sample of U. S. animal-owning families with children finds that, on average, children who have
younger siblings spend about 10 minutes daily caring for pets,
but only about 2 minutes caring for a younger sibling (Melson,
2001). Similarly, in a sample of German 8- to 10-year olds with
animals at home, 25% reported sole responsibility for companion animal care, while 50% shared animal care with other
family members (Rost & Hartmann, 1994).
In addition, gender differences in nurturing other humans
make animal-directed nurture more important. From about
age five, children view nurturing and caregiving of young, dependent humans as feminine, and hence, at about the same
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time, girls show more motivation to nurture human young,
and in fact, engage in more nurturing behaviors toward them
(Melson, Fogel, & Toda, 1986). By contrast, there are no gender
differences in ideas about nurturing companion animals
(Melson & Fogel, 1989); boys and girls view companion animal
care as "gender-neutral," not associated with either the feminine or masculine sex role. Moreover, there are no consistent
gender differences in observed nurturing behaviors toward
such animals (Fogel, Melson, & Mistry, 1986). Thus, both the
widespread presence of animals in homes with children, combined with frequent caregiving open equally to boys and girls,
make companion animal care a potentially important "training ground" for developing nurturing motivations, skills, and
experiences. Unfortunately, prospective longitudinal studies
designed to test this hypothesis are lacking.
Conclusion: Understanding the Moral Terrain of
Human-Animal Relationships
This examination of children's moral reasoning toward
animals leads to some tentative conclusions: (1) From an early
age, children accord animals moral standing and reason about
them in terms of moral and social welfare issues; (2) There is
developmental change in moral reasoning about animals, but
the nature and "drivers" of that change are not well understood; (3) Among many influences, relationships with companion animals appear to play an important role in how children think about moral issues related to animals; (4) Links
between moral and pro-social reasoning about animals, on
the one hand, and corresponding behaviors, on the other, are
complex, with both individual child characteristics and social
factors playing a role.
What might future theory and research on children's
moral reasoning about animals look like? The following suggestions are offered in the spirit of encouraging integration of
issues of morality and social welfare about non-human species
into mainstream discourse about morality in human-human
relationships.
(1) Develop studies that directly assess moral reasoning
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about animals in the context of reasoning about other
life forms, such as plants, other humans, and ecological
systems. Direct comparisons within the same study,
using parallel measures, are most useful in determining
both similarities and differences. The study by Dunlap
(1989) stands out as a model of this approach.
(2) Use fine-grained measures of moral reasoning
that distinguish recognition of moral standing
from underlying reasoning about the basis for that
moral standing. Studies by Kahn, Melson and their
colleagues, discussed earlier, can provide the basis for
further development of such measures. Because verbal
skills are limited in young children, interview methods
should be supplemented with careful observation of
children's spontaneous behaviors and remarks, as
Myers (1998) has done.
(3) Draw on the extensive literature on the development
of moral and pro-social reasoning about humans to test
hypotheses concerning a developmental progression
with respect to thinking about animals. Too often,
scholars of the human-animal bond have worked in
relative isolation from social scientists investigating
parallel questions within human relationships.
(4) Use theory and research on moral and pro-social
reasoning about animals to inform educational
interventions aimed at increasing animal welfare. For
example, humane education programs can be designed
to directly test predictions, based on Kohlberg's theory,
that challenging discussions among peers would
stimulate moral reasoning to more mature levels. As
another suggestion, research on the importance of
parents as "drivers" of moral reasoning and behavior
(with respect to both other humans and animals) might
lead to more home-based, parent-centered curricula or
educational materials.
In general, children are part of the world of animals, and
that world is full of moral and ethical questions. How children
answer those questions will affect how all life forms on the
planet will fare in the future.
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